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Syntactic Possibilistic Goal Generation
Ce´lia da Costa Pereira and Andrea G. B. Tettamanzi1
Abstract. We propose syntactic deliberation and goal election al-
gorithms for possibilistic agents which are able to deal with incom-
plete and imprecise information in a dynamic world. We show that
the proposed algorithms are equivalent to their semantic counterparts
already presented in the literature. We show that they lead to an ef-
ficient implementation of a possibilistic BDI model of agency which
integrates goal generation.
1 Introduction
Researchers in the field of AI are growing more and more aware
of the importance of integrating the goal generation process when
representing the agent’s capabilities [12]. Indeed, the idea of fixing
a priori the goals that an agent must achieve is acceptable only for
few domains where all possible goals can be determined in advance.
On the other hand, a suitable framework for representing the agent’s
capabilities should consider the fact that an agent must also choose
which goals to pursue from the collection of goals which have been
generated previously [14, 15, 5].
In most real world situations, information available for an agent is
incomplete. This means that the set of the agent’s beliefs represents
an imprecise description of the real world. Possibility theory [17] is
well-suited for modeling uncertain or vague information by means of
a possibility distribution. In [5], the authors used such a distribution
to propose a semantic representation of beliefs allowing thus to ex-
press that some worlds (interpretations) are more plausible for a BDI
agent than others. As pointed out by Dubois et al. [9], this seman-
tic view of beliefs is also the one developed in the theory of belief
change by Ga¨rdenfors [10]. In that theory, the logical consequences
of the belief base [13] represents the full set of the agent’s beliefs —
its belief set. In this semantic setting, adding new information to a
belief set comes down to some worlds which were previously pos-
sible becoming impossible. This means that the more information is
available, the smaller the set of worlds considered possible by the
agent and the more precise the information held by the agent. It is
important to observe that, while this kind of semantic representation
is well-suited to a theoretical treatment of the matter, it is not at all
adapted to the implementation of an agent framework. This is why,
to use a syntactic possibilistic representation of beliefs, in [6] the
authors propose an equivalent syntactic possibilistic belief-change
operator.
An algorithm for generating the goals of an agent based on the
semantic representation of beliefs and desires was proposed in [5].
However, to the best of our knowledge, no one has yet proposed
an algorithm for goal generation based on the syntactic counterparts
of the possibilistic representations of beliefs and desires. This paper
aims at bridging this gap and at making an efficient implementation
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of the agent’s goal generation and adoption possible. We provide the
syntactic version of the possibilistic deliberation algorithm and of the
goal-election algorithm proposed in [5].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
some basic definitions in possibility theory. Section 3 presents the
representation of graded beliefs both in the syntactic and in the se-
mantic settings. Section 4 presents the components of the possibilis-
tic model. Section 5 presents a syntactic representation of desires
while in Section 6 an algorithm for generating such kind of desires is
proposed. Section 7 presents the two algorithms used for selecting as
goals the maximally justified desires among the maximally possible
desires. Finally, Section 8 concludes the paper.
2 Background
In this section, we present some basic definitions in possibility theory
that will be used throughout the paper.
2.1 Language and Interpretations
We adopt a classical propositional language to develop the theoretical
framework used to represent information manipulated by an agent.
Definition 1 (Language) Let A be a finite set of atomic proposi-
tions and letL be the propositional language such thatA∪{⊤,⊥} ⊆
L, and, ∀φ, ψ ∈ L, ¬φ ∈ L, φ ∧ ψ ∈ L, φ ∨ ψ ∈ L.
Additional connectives can be defined as useful shorthands for
combination of connectives of L, e.g., φ ⊃ ψ ≡ ¬φ ∨ ψ.
We will denote byΩ = {0, 1}A the set of all interpretations onA.
An interpretation ω ∈ Ω is a function ω : A → {0, 1} assigning a
truth value pω to every atomic proposition p ∈ A and, by extension,
a truth value φω to all formulas φ ∈ L; ω |= φ means that φω = 1
(ω is a model of φ); if S ⊆ L is a set of formulas, ω |= S means
ω |= φ for all φ ∈ S; S |= φ means that ∀ω |= S, ω |= φ.
The notation [φ] denotes the set of all models of formula φ ∈ L:
[φ] = {ω ∈ Ω : ω |= φ}. Likewise, if S ⊆ L is a set of formulas,
[S] = {ω ∈ Ω : ∀φ ∈ S, ω |= φ} =
⋂
φ∈S
[φ].
2.2 Possibility Theory
Fuzzy sets [16] are sets whose elements have degrees of membership
in [0, 1]. Possibility theory is a mathematical theory of uncertainty
that relies upon fuzzy set theory, in that the (fuzzy) set of possible
values for a variable of interest is used to describe the uncertainty as
to its precise value. At the semantic level, the membership function
of such set, pi, is called a possibility distribution and its range is [0, 1].
By convention, pi(ω) = 1 means that it is totally possible for ω to
be the real world, 1 > pi(ω) > 0 means that ω is only somehow
possible, while pi(ω) = 0means that ω is certainly not the real world.
A possibility distribution pi is said to be normalized if there ex-
ists at least one interpretation ω0 s.t. pi(ω0) = 1, i.e., there exists
at least one possible situation which is consistent with the available
knowledge.
Definition 2 (Measures) A possibility distribution pi induces a pos-
sibility measure Π, its dual necessity measure N , and a guaranteed
possibility measure ∆. They all apply to a classical set A ⊆ Ω and
are defined as follows:
Π(A) = max
ω∈A
pi(ω); (1)
N(A) = 1−Π(A¯) = min
ω∈A¯
{1− pi(ω)}; (2)
∆(A) = min
ω∈A
pi(ω). (3)
In words, Π(A) expresses to what extent A is consistent with the
available knowledge. Conversely, N(A) expresses to what extent A
is entailed by the available knowledge. The guaranteed possibility
measure [8] estimates to what extent all the values in A are actually
possible according to what is known, i.e., any value in A is at least
possible at degree∆(A).
3 Syntactic and Semantic Representations
A possibilistic belief base is a finite set of weighted formulas B =
{(φi, αi), i = 1, . . . , n}, where αi is understood as a lower bound of
the degree of necessityN([φi]) (i.e.,N([φi]) ≥ αi). Here,B(φi) =
αi means that the degree to which formula φi belongs to the set B
is αi. Formulas with αi = 0 are not explicitly represented in the
belief base, i.e., only a belief which is somehow believed/accepted by
the agent is explicitly represented. The higher the weight, the more
certain the formula.
From belief base B the degree of belief B(φ) of any arbitrary
formula φ ∈ L may be computed as follows [2]:
B(φ) = max{α : Bα |= φ}, (4)
where Bα = {φ : B(φ) ≥ α}, with α ∈ [0, 1], is called an α-cut of
B. The meaning of Equation 4 is that the degree to which an agent
believes φ is given by the maximal degree α such that φ is entailed
only by the formulas whose degree of membership in the base is at
least α. This is the syntactic representation of graded beliefs [2] that
we will use in this paper.
Alternatively, one may regard a belief as a necessity degree in-
duced by a normalized2 possibility distribution pi on the possible
worlds ω ∈ Ω [2]: pi : Ω → [0, 1], where pi(ω) is the possibility
degree of interpretation ω. In this case, the degree to which a given
formula φ ∈ L is believed can be calculated as B(φ) = N([φ]) =
1−maxω 6|=φ pi(ω), whereN is the necessity measure induced by pi.
This is the semantic representation of graded beliefs proposed in [2]
which has been used in [5].
The syntactic and the semantic representations of graded beliefs
are equivalent [7]. Therefore, they may be used interchangeably as
convenience demands. This means that, given a belief base B such
that, for all α, Bα is consistent, one can construct a possibility dis-
tribution pi such that, for all φ ∈ L, N([φ]) = max{α : Bα |= φ},
where Bα is the α-cut of base B. In particular, pi may be defined as
follows: for all ω ∈ Ω,
pi(ω) = 1−max{α : Bα |= ¬φω}, (5)
2 Normalization of a possibility distribution corresponds to consistency of the
beliefs.
where φω denotes the minterm of ω, i.e., the formula satisfied by ω
only. Notice that pi is normalized. Indeed, since, by hypothesis, for
all α, Bα is consistent, there exists an interpretation ω
∗ ∈ Ω, such
that, for all α ∈ (0, 1], ω∗ |= Bα; therefore, pi(ω
∗) = 1, because no
formula φ exists such that ω∗ 6|= φ and B(φ) > 0.
4 A Possibilistic BDI Model
The possibilistic BDI model of agency we adopt is an adaptation of
the one used in [5]. The main difference is that we replace the seman-
tic representation of beliefs and desires with syntactic representations
in the form of a belief base B and a desire baseD. Figure 1 provides
a schematic illustration of the model.
BELIEFS
DESIRES
INTENTIONS
B ✲
Eq. 4
B
❄
❄
RJ
✲ Syntactic Deliberation
(Algorithm 2)
❄
D ✲
Eq. 11
J
✛
✲
Syntactic
Goal Election
(Algorithm 6)
❄
G
∗✛Planner
❄
Actions
Figure 1. A schematic illustration of the proposed BDI model. The
meaning of the symbols is explained in the text.
The agent receives information from the outside world and thus
forms its beliefs. The “program” of the agent consists of a number of
desire-generation rules, contained in a rule-baseRJ . These, together
with the beliefs, determine a set of goals, which are then fed into a
planner module to compute the actions to be performed by the agent.
The internal mental state of the agent is completely described by
a possibilistic belief base B and by a set of desire-generation rules
RJ . The set B of the formulas believed by the agent is computed
from B according to Equation 4.
The set J of the agent’s justified desires is generated dynamically
through a deliberation process which applies the rules in RJ to the
current beliefs and justified desires to produce a desire baseD, from
which the fuzzy set of justified desires J is computed according to
Equation 11.
Finally, the agent rationally elects its goals G∗ from the justified
desires J as the most desirable of the possible sets of justified desires,
according to its beliefs. The agent then plans its actions to achieve the
elected goals G∗ by means of a planner module, whose discussion
lies outside of the scope of this paper.
In the following sections, we give technical details about all the
components of the model and about syntactic deliberation and goal
election algorithms. To help the reader, we will use an adaptation of
the running example of [5], which follows.
Example Dr. A. Gent has submitted a paper to ECAI 2014 he has
written with his co-author I. M. Flaky, who has promised to go to
Prague to present it if it is accepted. Dr. Gent knows that, if the paper
is accepted, publishing it (which is his great desire), means to pay the
conference registration (for his co-author or for himself) and then be
ready to go to Prague to present it, in case I. M. is unavailable.
If the paper is accepted (a), Dr. Gent is willing to pay the registra-
tion (r); furthermore, if the paper is accepted and Dr. Flaky turns out
to be unavailable (q), he is willing to go to Prague to present it (p).
Finally, if he knows the paper is accepted and wishes to present it, he
will desire to have a hotel room (h) and a plane ticket reserved (t).
Then, one fine day, Dr. Gent receives the notification of acceptance
of his paper: the source is fully trustworthy—the program chair of
ECAI 2014. However, soon after learning that the paper has been ac-
cepted, Dr. Flaky rushes into Dr. Gent’s office to inform him that he
is no more available to go to Prague; as always, Dr. Gent does not
completely trust what Dr. Flaky tells him, as he is well accustomed
to his changing mind. A few weeks later, rumors get to Dr. Gent’s
ear that all the hotels in Prague are full (f ); although Dr. Gent con-
siders this news as yet unverified, he takes notice of it. Let’s assume
that, combined with his a priori beliefs, like that if the planes are all
booked out (b), he might not succeed in reserving a flight, this yields
Dr. Gent’s beliefs, represented by the following base:
B = {(b ⊃ ¬t, 0.9), (f, 0.2), (q, 0.75),
(a, 1), (f ⊃ ¬h, 1), (p ⊃ (a ∧ r), 1)}.
(6)
5 Representing Desires
We may regard desires as expression of preference for some states of
affairs over some others. Therefore, from a semantic point of view,
such preference may be encoded as an assignment of a qualitative
utility u(ω) ∈ [0, 1] to every world ω ∈ Ω: u(ω) = 0 means that
ω is among the least preferred worlds, u(ω) = 1 means that ω is
among the most preferred worlds, and u(ω) > u(ω′) means that
ω is preferred to ω′. Such qualitative utility u is thus, formally, a
possibility distribution.
Guaranteed possibility measure,∆, can be used to associate a pref-
erence degree to arbitrary formulas [3]. The set of the agent’s justified
desires, J, a fuzzy set of formulas in the language of choice, is thus
defined based on possibility distribution u, which, unlike pi, needs
not be normalized, since desires may very well be inconsistent, as
follows: for all formulas φ ∈ L,
J(φ) = ∆([φ]) = min
ω|=φ
u(ω). (7)
J may be extended to sets of formulas in the following way. Let
S ⊆ L be a set of formulas, then J(S) = minφ∈S J(φ).
The basic mechanism which determines how desires arise, i.e.,
which desires are justified and to which extent, is rule-based and may
be described in terms of desire-generation rules.
Definition 3 (Desire-Generation Rule) A desire-generation rule r
is an expression of the form βr, ψr ⇒
+
D φ,
3 where βr, ψr, φ ∈ L.
The unconditional counterpart of this rule is α ⇒+D φ, with α ∈
(0, 1].
The intended meaning of a conditional desire-generation rule is:
“an agent desires every world in which φ is true at least as much as
it believes βr and desires ψr”. The intended meaning of an uncondi-
tional rule is straightforward: the degree to which the agent desires φ
is α.
Given a desire-generation rule r, we shall denote rhs(r) the for-
mula on the right-hand side of r.
3 Note that the implication used to define a desire-generation rule is not the
material implication.
Example (continued) Dr. Gent’sRJ may be described by the fol-
lowing desire-generation rules:
R1 : a, p ⇒
+
D t ∧ h,
R2 : a ∧ q, ⊥ ⇒
+
D p,
R3 : a, ⊥ ⇒
+
D r.
The degree of activation of a desire-generation rule depends on the
degree to which its left-hand side is satisfied, i.e., the degree to which
βr is believed and ψr is desired.
Definition 4 (Rule Activation) Let r = βr, ψr ⇒
+
D φ be a desire-
generation rule. The degree af activation of r, Deg(r), is given by
Deg(r) = min{B(βr),J(ψr)}.
For an unconditional rule r = αr ⇒
+
D φ, Deg(r) = αr .
A semantic deliberation algorithm was proposed in [5] which,
given a belief base B induced by a possibility distribution pi and a
set of desire-generation rules RJ , computes the corresponding pos-
sibility distribution u.
In order to replace such algorithm with a syntactic deliberation
algorithm, the first step is to replace the qualitative utility u with a
desire baseD, which, by analogy with the belief baseB, will be rep-
resented as a fuzzy set of formulas. However, whereas the member-
ship degrees of B are interpreted and treated as necessity degrees,
the membership degrees of formulas of D are to be interpreted as
minimum guaranteed possibilities. In D, each piece of information
[φi, αi] expresses that any world satisfying φi is considered satisfac-
tory for the agent to at least a degree αi.
Let supp(D) = {φ : D(φ) > 0}. One important property that a
desire base should obey, which is a consequence of the membership
degrees representing guaranteed possibilities is that, for all formulas
φ, ψ ∈ supp(D),
if φ |= ψ then D(φ) ≥ D(ψ). (8)
Exactly as a belief baseB induces a corresponding possibility dis-
tribution piB , a desire base D induces a corresponding qualitative
utility uD as follows (cf. Definition 12 in [4]): for all ω ∈ Ω,
uD(ω) = max
φ:ω|=φ
D(φ). (9)
If ω does not satisfy any formula φ in D then ω is not satisfactory
at all for the agent. Formally, if there is no [φi, ai] ∈ D such that
ω |= φi then uD(ω) = 0.
The above definition may be understood as follows: every formula
φ occurring in the desire base may be regarded as the representative
of [φ], the set of its models. It has been proven in [9] that uD , de-
fined as per Equation 9, is the most specific possibility distribution
satisfyingD(φ) = ∆([φ]) for all formulas φ ∈ supp(D).
Now, let JD be the (fuzzy) set of justified desires inD. By defini-
tion, the degree of justification of all formulas occurring in the base
must be identical to their degree of membership in the base, i.e., for
all formulas φ,
if D(φ) > 0 then JD(φ) = D(φ).
IfD(φ) = α, it means thatminω∈[φ] uD(ω) = α, or, in other terms,
that, ∀ω ∈ [φ], uD(ω) ≥ α. Therefore, we get Equation 9.
The next step is to show how, given a desire base D, the degree
of justification of any arbitrary desire formula ψ may be calculated.
Based on the definition of J, we may write, for all formulas ψ,
JD(ψ) = min
ω|=ψ
uD(ω) = min
ω|=ψ
max
φ:ω|=φ
D(φ). (10)
We now have to eliminate all references to the models ω from the
above formula in order to make it “syntactic”. We do not want ref-
erences to the models because we do not want to be obliged to enu-
merate all the interpretations explicitly in order to compute JD(ψ).
This is indeed the reason why the syntactic view for goal generation
proposed in this paper should lead to a more efficient implementa-
tion than the semantic view already present in the literature. We will
show this assertion later in the paper.
One way to obtain the elimination of all references to the models is
to construct a set of formulasP(D), the “partition” ofΩ according to
D, containing all the 2‖supp(D)‖ conjunctions of positive or negated
formulas occurring inD.
Proposition 1 Let supp(D) = {φ1, φ2, . . . , φn} and let P(D) =
{ξ0, ξ1, ξ2, . . . , ξ2n−1} with
ξ0 = ¬φ1 ∧ ¬φ2 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬φn,
ξ1 = φ1 ∧ ¬φ2 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬φn,
...
...
ξ2n−1 = φ1 ∧ φ2 ∧ . . . ∧ φn.
Then, with the convention thatmax ∅ = 0,
JD(ψ) = min
ξ∈P(D)
ψ∧ξ 6=⊥
max
φ∈supp(D)
ξ|=φ
D(φ) =
= min
i=0,...,2n−1
ψ∧ξi 6=⊥
max
j=1,...,n
ξi|=φj
D(φj).
(11)
Proof: The models of the formulas in P(D) form a partition of Ω:
2n−1⋃
i=0
[ξi] = Ω, ∀i, j, i 6= j, ξi ∧ ξj = ⊥.
The qualitative utility uD is constant over each [ξi]: for all ω |= ξi,
uD(ω) = max
j=1,...,n
ξi|=φj
D(φj). (12)
Therefore, instead of minimizing over all ω ∈ Ω, it is sufficient to
minimize over all ξi ∈ P(D). Moreover, since we are minimizing
uD(ω) over all models of ψ, we should only consider those ξi such
that [ξi] ∩ [ψ] 6= ∅, i.e., such that ξi ∧ ψ 6= ⊥. ✷
Example (continued) Let’s assume Dr. Gent’s desire base is
D = {(t ∧ h, 0.75), (p, 0.75), (r, 1)}.
We will see later how such base may be derived from the desire-
generation rules. To be able to compute J(ψ) for any arbitrary for-
mula ψ, we may pre-compute P(D) and, for all ξi ∈ P(D), the
corresponding term αi = maxφ∈supp(D)
ξi|=φ
D(φ) in Equation 11:
ξ0 = ¬(t ∧ h) ∧ ¬p ∧ ¬r, α0 = max ∅ = 0,
ξ1 = (t ∧ h) ∧ ¬p ∧ ¬r, α1 = max{0.75} = 0.75,
ξ2 = ¬(t ∧ h) ∧ p ∧ ¬r, α2 = max{0.75} = 0.75,
ξ3 = (t ∧ h) ∧ p ∧ ¬r, α3 = max{0.75, 0.75} = 0.75,
ξ4 = ¬(t ∧ h) ∧ ¬p ∧ r, α4 = max{1} = 1,
ξ5 = (t ∧ h) ∧ ¬p ∧ r, α5 = max{0.75, 1} = 1,
ξ6 = ¬(t ∧ h) ∧ p ∧ r, α6 = max{0.75, 1} = 1,
ξ7 = (t ∧ h) ∧ p ∧ r, α7 = max{0.75, 0.75, 1} = 1.
Now if, for instance, we want to compute J(ψ), we will have to
compute the minimum, for i such that ψ ∧ ξi 6= ⊥, of the αi. There-
fore, we have, for example, J(t) = 0 and J(r) = 1.
Based on Equation 11, computing the degree of justification of for-
mula ψ given the desire baseD requires O(n2n) entailment checks,
where n is the size of the desire base. Checking whether a formula
entails another formula is a logical reasoning problem which may be
reduced to the satisfiablility problem, whose computational complex-
ity varies depending on the specific logic considered, but does not
depend on n. For instance, satisfiability in propositional logic (also
known as Boolean satisfiability) is NP-complete [11]; concept satis-
fiability in description logics goes from polynomial to NEXPTIME-
complete [1].
6 Generating Desires
We are now ready to present a syntactic deliberation algorithm,
which calculates the desire base given a set of desire-generation rules
RJ and a belief setB.
We first recall the semantic deliberation algorithm presented in
[5]. Let RωJ = {r ∈ RJ : ω |= rhs(r)} denote the subset of
RJ containing just the rules whose right-hand side would be true in
world ω and Degµ(r) the degree of activation of rule r calculated
using µ as the qualitative utility assignment. Given a mental state
S = 〈pi,RJ〉, the following algorithm computes the corresponding
qualitative utility assignment, u.
Algorithm 1 (Semantic Deliberation)
INPUT: pi,RJ . OUTPUT: u.
1. i← 0; for all ω ∈ Ω, u0(ω)← 0;
2. i← i+ 1;
3. For all ω ∈ Ω,
ui(ω)←
{
maxr∈Rω
J
Degui−1(r), ifR
ω
J 6= ∅,
0, otherwise;
4. if maxω |ui(ω) − ui−1(ω)| > 0, i.e., if a fixpoint has not been
reached yet, go back to Step 2;
5. For all ω ∈ Ω, u(ω) ← ui(ω); u is the qualitative utility assign-
ment corrisponding to mental state S.
Let DegX(r) be the degree of activation of rule r based on the
desire base X . When X = ∅, the degree of justification of all de-
sire formulas is zero. The belief base B does not change during the
deliberation process.
Algorithm 2 (Syntactic Deliberation)
INPUT: B,RJ . OUTPUT: D.
1. i← 0;D0 ← ∅;
2. i← i+ 1;
3. Di ← {(rhs(r),DegDi−1(r)) : r ∈ RJ};
4. if Di 6= Di−1, i.e., if a fixpoint has not been reached yet, go back
to Step 2;
5. D ← Di and the deliberation has finished.
We now have to prove that this syntactic deliberation algorithm
is equivalent to the semantic deliberation algorithm presented in [5].
The hypothesis is summarized in the following diagram:
RJ
✲
Algorithm 1
u
✲
Algorithm 2
D ✲
Equation 9
uD
Proposition 2 We can prove that uD = u.
Proof:We may proceed by induction: we will consider the sequence
{ui}i=0,1,... of the possibility distributions constructed by Algo-
rithm 1 and the sequence {uDi}i=0,1,..., whose elements uDi are the
possibility distributions induced by the desire bases Di constructed
by Algorithm 2, and we will prove that, if ui−1 = uDi−1 , then
ui = uDi .
Now, ui−1 = uDi−1 means that Degui−1(r) = DegDi−1(r) for
all rules r. By Equation 9, for all ω ∈ Ω, we may write
uDi(ω) = maxφ:ω|=φDi(φ)
= maxr∈RJ :ω|=rhs(r)DegDi−1(r)
= maxr∈Rω
J
Degui−1(r) = ui(ω).
This proves the induction step. Finally, it is straightforward to verify
that u0 = uD0 , therefore the two sequences will be identical and so
their limits, u and uD , and this concludes the proof. ✷
Example (continued) Let us apply Algorithm 2 to Dr. Gent’s
mental state: we obtain
D0 = ∅,
D1 = {(p, 0.75), (r, 1)},
D2 = {(t ∧ h, 0.75), (p, 0.75), (r, 1)},
D3 = {(t ∧ h, 0.75), (p, 0.75), (r, 1)} = D2.
Therefore,
D = {(t ∧ h, 0.75), (p, 0.75), (r, 1)}. (13)
7 Generating Goals
In [5], the assumption was made that a rational agent would select as
goals the maximally justified desires among the maximally possible
desires. In other words, a rational agent should first restrict attention
only to those desires that it would be most normal (i.e., unsurprising,
likely, . . . ) to expect they might come true and then decide to actively
pursue those, among them, that have the highest qualitative utility.
In order to write a goal election algorithm according to such as-
sumption, we need to define the set of desires possible to a given
degree.
Definition 5 Given γ ∈ (0, 1], Jγ = {φ ∈ supp(J) : Π([φ]) ≥ γ}
is the (classical) subset of supp(J) containing only those desires
whose overall possibility is at least γ. We recall that Π([φ]) = 1 −
B(¬φ).
We now define a goal set for a given level of possibility γ, as the
set of the maximally justified γ-possible desires.
Definition 6 (Goal set) The γ-possible goal set is
Gγ =
{
argmaxS⊆Jγ J(S) if Jγ 6= ∅,
∅ otherwise.
We denote by γ∗ the maximum possibility level such thatGγ 6= ∅.
Then, the goal set elected by a rational agent will be
G
∗ = Gγ∗ , γ
∗ = max
Gγ 6=∅
γ. (14)
Let Img(pi) be the level set4 of possibility distribution pi and
Img(u) be the level set of qualitative distribution u. Notice that
Img(u) and Img(pi) are both finite, independently of Ω being finite,
as proven in [5].
The following two algorithms, adapted from [5], allow an agent to
compute Gγ for a given possibility lower bound γ, and the optimal
goal setG∗, based on a semantic representation of beliefs and desires
as two possibility distributions, pi and u. We will call them semantic,
to distinguish them from the two algorithms that we are going to pro-
pose to replace them, which will assume a syntactic representation of
both beliefs and desires.
Algorithm 3 (Semantic Computation of Gγ)
INPUT: pi, u. OUTPUT: Gγ .
1. δ ← max Img(u);
2. determine the least specific formula φ such that J(φ) ≥ δ as fol-
lows:
φ←
∨
u(ω)≥δ
φω,
where φω denotes the minterm of ω, i.e., the formula satisfied by
ω only;
3. if Π([φ]) ≥ γ, terminate with Gγ = {φ}; otherwise,
4. δ ← max{α ∈ Img(u) : α < δ}, 0 if no such α exists;
5. if δ > 0, go back to Step 2;
6. terminate with Gγ = ∅.
Algorithm 4 (Semantic Goal Election)
INPUT: pi, u. OUTPUT: G∗.
1. γ ← max Img(pi) = 1, since pi is normalized;
2. compute Gγ by Algorithm 3;
3. if Gγ 6= ∅, terminate with γ
∗ = γ, G∗ = Gγ; otherwise,
4. γ ← max{α ∈ Img(pi) : α < γ}, 0 if no such α exists;
5. if γ > 0, go back to Step 2;
6. terminate with G∗ = ∅: no goal may be elected.
Proposition 3 The syntactic versions of Algorithms 3 and 4 are Al-
gorithms 5 and 6 given below.
Algorithm 5 (Syntactic Computation of Gγ¯)
INPUT: B,D. OUTPUT: Gγ¯ .
1. δ ← max Img(D);
2. ifminψ∈Dδ B(¬ψ) ≤ γ¯, terminate with Gγ¯ = Dδ;
otherwise,
3. δ ← max{α ∈ Img(D) : α < δ}, 0 if no such α exists;
4. if δ > 0, go back to Step 2;
5. terminate with Gγ¯ = ∅.
Algorithm 6 (Syntactic Goal Election)
INPUT: B,D. OUTPUT: G∗.
1. γ¯ ← 0;
2. compute Gγ¯ by Algorithm 5;
3. if Gγ 6= ∅, terminate with γ
∗ = 1− γ¯, G∗ = Gγ¯; otherwise,
4. γ¯ ← min{α ∈ Img(B) : α > γ¯}, 1 if no such α exists;
5. if γ¯ < 1, go back to Step 2;
6. terminate with G∗ = ∅: no goal may be elected.
Proof:We begin by observing that Img(u) = Img(D), i.e., the level
set of the desire base is the same as the level set of the corresponding
qualitative utility. Furthermore, since we now have a desire base, we
4 The level set of a possibility distribution pi is the set of α ∈ [0, 1] : ∃ω
such that pi(ω) = α.
may replace the construction of φ based on the minterms in Step 2 of
Algorithm 3 with a more straightforward
φ←
∨
D(ψ)≥δ
ψ =
∨
ψ∈Dδ
ψ,
that is, the disjunction of all the formulas in the δ-cut of the desire
base. This also suggests that, instead of returning Gγ = {φ}, it is
equivalent, but more intuitive, to returnGγ = Dδ . Finally, instead of
testing the condition Π([φ]) ≥ γ in Step 3, it is equivalent to test the
condition B(¬φ) ≤ 1 − γ. Now, by the DeMorgan laws and by the
properties of necessity,5
B(¬φ) = B
( ∧
ψ∈Dδ
¬ψ
)
= min
ψ∈Dδ
B(¬ψ),
which allows us to avoid constructing φ explicitly and to test directly
the conditionminψ∈Dδ B(¬ψ) ≤ 1− γ.
This also suggests that we define γ¯ = 1− γ as the “impossibility
of the goals”, and reformulate the goal election algorithm as a search
for the least impossible set of maximally justified goals. ✷
Since (i) Algorithm 6 iterates over the level set of the belief base
and (ii) Algorithm 5, which is called as a subroutine at each iteration
of Algorithm 6, loops over the level set of the desire base, and (iii)
the most complex task performed at each iteration of Algorithm 5 is
computing the degree of belief of each negated desire formula ψ in
a δ-cut of the desire base, we may conclude that the computational
cost (in number of entailment checks) of syntactic goal election is
O(‖Img(B)‖ · ‖Img(D)‖) · C,
where C is the number of entailment checks needed for computing
B(φ) for an arbitrary formula φ, given the belief base B, which
is done using Equation 4, thus giving C = O(‖Img(B)‖). Fur-
thermore, we may observe that ‖Img(B)‖ ≤ ‖B‖ = m and
‖Img(D)‖ ≤ ‖D‖ = n. Therefore, we may conclude that carrying
out the syntactic goal election requires O(m2n) entailment checks.
The termination of Algorithms 1 and 4 is proved in [5]; the termi-
nation of Algorithms 2 and 6 is a direct consequence of their termi-
nation.
Example (continued) Wemay now apply Algorithm 6 to elect the
goals of Dr. Gent, given that his belief base is the one given in Equa-
tion 6 and his desire base is the one given in Equation 13; therefore,
Img(B) = {0.2, 0.75, 0.9, 1} and Img(D) = {0.75, 1}.
We begin by calling Algorithm 5 with γ¯ = 0: δ is set to
max Img(D) = 1, and the corresponding δ-cut of D is in fact the
core of D, D1 = {(r, 1)}. Now, B(¬r) = 0 ≤ γ¯; therefore G0 =
{r} and Algorithm 6 terminates immediately with γ∗ = 1− γ¯ = 1,
G∗ = G0 = {r}, i.e., Dr. Gent will elect as his goal just to register
to ECAI 2014.
8 Conclusions
We have proposed a syntactic representation for desires within a pos-
sibilistic BDI model of agency; we have shown its equivalence to the
semantic representation based on a qualitative utility; we have pro-
vided the syntactic equivalent of the deliberation algorithm, which
generates the set of justified desires given a set of desire-generation
5 N(A ∩B) = min{N(A), N(B)}.
rules and a belief base. We have then provided the syntactic equiva-
lent of the goal election algorithm, which generates the goals as the
maximally justified desires among the maximally possible desires.
The cost of computing the degree of justification of a formula and
of electing the goals has been given in terms of the basic operation
of checking whether a formula entails another formula. Even though
the cost of the former task grows exponentially with to the size of the
desire base, in practice it is expected to be feasible, given that the size
of the desire base depends on the number of desire-generation rules
and it is hard to think of applications that would call for a large num-
ber of such rules. On the other hand, goal generation is polynomial in
the size of the belief and desire bases. Compare this to what happens
when using the semantic representation, where 2‖L‖ interpretations
have to be explicitly represented and iterated over to compute the
degree of justification of a formula. In our opinion, a syntactic com-
putation of beliefs, desires, and goals is the only viable alternative to
implement possibilitic agents based on languages whose semantics
involve an infinite number of possible worlds. This is why we be-
lieve the results here presented are a first and important step towards
the practical implementation of a possibilistic BDI framework.
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